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A B S T R A C T 
Since independence, Burundi has endured civil war episodes, five successful and two unsuccessful coup 
d’états. The instability resulted in the collapse of the economy despite the consummation of the Arusha 
Agreement. This study moves away from the propensity to only view the security challenges as pitting 
Tutsis and Hutus.  Such an analytical tendency generates distortions. This study was qualitative and 
employed a systematic review research methodology in identifying relevant texts. Document analysis 
was then used to interpret meaning from documents giving them voice over the study area. The main 
findings were hinged on conflict causes, key assumptions, violence and instability in the past, impunity 
and governance, the approach to political realism, truth and reconciliation constraints. This study 
concludes that although power-sharing could be a necessary move as a measure of building 
confidence, sharing power is not an adequate condition for sustainable development and peace. 
© 2021 by the authors. Licensee SSBFNET, Istanbul, Turkey. This article is an open access article 
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license 




The country of Burundi has experienced authoritarian governance, politics which is exclusionary and repeated rounds of violence 
expressed ethnically involving the 1972 genocide and the civil war which began in 1993 (Curtis, 2012). Burundi’s modern history 
has been marked fundamentally by inequitable treatment during the European colonial rule which privileged the Tutsi in all spheres 
of life-generating inter-group conflict with the largest Hutu ethnic group constituting 85% of the country’s population (Takeuchi, 
2013).  
Early in the nineties, this inter-group tension escalated into a violent civil war lasting for more than 10 years (Oliva, 2016). The logic 
behind the discriminatory treatment under the colonial rule as a result of the Euro-centric Hamitic hypothesis an ideology whose 
basis was that the ethnic group of Tutsis was superior originating from Europe, while the Hutu ethnic group was inferior originating 
from Africa (Sanders, 1969; Chrétien, 2000).Burundi is a landlocked small country located in central Africa between Tanzania and 
Rwanda occupying only 27834 square kilometres densely populated with close to 11.89 million people in 2020 according to the 
world population review (WPR,2020). Burundi attained its political independence in 1962 on the 1st of July becoming a constitutional 
monarchy. However, the abolishment of the monarchy in 1966 saw the proclamation of a republic by a Tutsi named Michel 
Micombero who assumed power as a president.  
The political independence denoted the commencement of political volatility for the next 30 years marked by successive coups waged 
by the Tutsi armed forces, Hutu insurrections, insurgents’ mass killings in the years 1965, 1972, 1988 and then 1992 (Hatungimana, 
2011).  The following represents all the past presidents and the current one according to their ethnic group: (Tutsi)-Michel 
Micombero, (Tutsi)-Jean Baptiste Bagaza,(Tutsi)-Pierre Buyoya,(Hutu)-Sylvestre Ntibantunganya,(Hutu)-Melchior Ndadaye, 
(Tutsi)-Pierre Buyoya II, (Hutu)-Domitien Ndayizeye, (Hutu)-Pierre Nkurunziza, (Hutu)-Évariste Ndayishimiye- current. This list 
of successive presidents of Burundi since independence up until today is a testament that Burundi conflict and instability have not 
necessarily been an issue of ethnicity but one of some other underlying socio-economic factors.  
Research in Business & Social Science 
IJRBS VOL 10 NO 2 ISSN: 2147-4478 
Available online at www.ssbfnet.com 
Journal homepage: https://www.ssbfnet.com/ojs/index.php/ijrbs 
Chigudu, International Journal of Research in Business & Social Science 10(2) (2021), 296-305 
 
 297 
The open and latent contemporary intra-state tensions cannot be resolved, managed and prevented exclusively by political 
negotiations, peacekeeping, peace-making, application of force or diplomatic means. There could be more complex reasons including 
but not limited to state failure, resource predation, social inequality and violation of human rights. These may require collaborative 
international support in areas such as good governance, environmental preservation, sustainable economic development, cultivating 
democratic principles and protection of human rights. It is therefore imperative to acknowledge that development and security are 
mutually dependent as a critical first move in crafting effective policies and strategies to enhance development in Burundi. However, 
the international players need a deep understanding of how their development and security assistance is conceptually interlinked 
practically and at every specific stage of a conflict (IPA,2004). This study explores Burundi’s security and peace prospects by 
interrogating the origins of state fragility, manifestations, and effects with a thrust on the potential recurrence of political instability 
following the 2020 general elections. The findings will help to locate Burundi’s quest for democracy and development.  
This study aims to highlight the prospects for lasting peace and security in Burundi towards development. This study was qualitative 
and employed a systematic review research methodology in identifying relevant texts. Document analysis was then used to interpret 
meaning from documents giving them voice over the study area (Bowen, 2009).  Thus, Bowen (2009) asserts that it is a method 
which is less expensive used to obtain empirical data through an unobtrusive or nonreactive process. The documents were regarded 
as social facts organised for use (Atkinson & Coffey, 1997). Some expert and academic documents were collected from credible 
sources such as newspapers, manuals, journals, survey data, background papers and reports from organisations among others. The 
criteria for selection included publications, time period, keywords, and country-specifics.  The document analysis is especially 
applicable to intensive studies creating rich descriptions of the area under study (Yin, 1994; Stake, 1995).  Even though document 
analysis has been utilised in many cases to supplement some other methods, it is also employable as a stand-alone research method 
(Bowen,2009). Data analysis was iteratively blended with both elements of thematic analysis and content analysis. Thus, the content 
was coded into similar analysable themes (Bowen,2009).  
Conceptual Framework 
This section reviews literature under the following areas; the conceptual contest, the pre-colonial era in Burundi, Burundi under 
colonisation, the independent Burundi, volatility in politics and state collapse, cyclical violence and the pursuit of peace, and peace 
negotiations led by Africa. 
Peace agreements in theory may be classified under the peace-making rubric or preventive diplomacy. Preventive engagement is any 
intercessory or structural means meant to gradually decrease the underlying obstructions causing disputes and conflicts (Lund, 2002). 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali the then UN Secretary-General described preventive diplomacy in his ground-breaking report entitled ‘An 
Agenda for Peace’ in 1992 as including the activities taken to diminish the spreading of conflicts if they happen (UNSG,1992). On 
the other hand, he described peace-making as any activity that brings conflicting parties to some accord, principally through non-
violent means as provided in the Charter of the United Nations’ Chapter VI (Apuuli,2017). The non-violent ways provided in the UN 
Charter involve mediation, adjudication, negotiation, inquiry, conciliation, arbitration and regional diplomacy.  The Arusha 
Agreement was ostensibly designed for limiting the increase of hostility in Burundi as a form of preventive diplomacy and to help 
conflicting parties to get to a negotiating table. A peace agreement bridges peace from war (Olson, 1998) and it is meant to have 
conflicts transformed into relationships that are more beneficial between groups and people (Wallensteen, 2007). In international 
contemporary politics, the significance of peace agreements is that they assist in curtailing violence.  Wallensteen (2007) argue that 
an agreement provides a mutual understanding of issues as well as new group relationship. Bekoe (2003) observes that if signatories 
of the peace agreement have to see the promises through, they have to feel obligated to do so not just for purposes of positive gains 
as a result of complying but because of the negative ramifications of defaulting. A party which reneges or undermines execution of 
the agreement has to be effectively sanctioned.  In general, agreements of peace are vulnerable to factions that are not willing to 
honour obligations or are vulnerable to those bent on implementing the provisos without good faith.  
Stedman (1997) contends that processes of peace tend to create spoilers. Such spoilers are described as parties and leaders to a peace 
accord who employ violence to undermine efforts of achieving peace (Stedman, 1996). They can be part of the team of negotiators 
or part of those excluded from negotiations. While spoilers from inside are those actors or parties in the negotiations for peace 
showing a semblance of willingness to broker a solution though eventually unable to meet key agreement obligations, spoilers from 
outside are those parties or actors excluded completely, for some reason, unwittingly or actively from the peace negotiations process 
(Stedman, 1996). Regarding Burundi, whereas the CNDD-FDD a rebellious group never participated in the Arusha Agreement 
negotiation process to its logical conclusion, it only came to be a participant after concluding a disparate ceasefire accord in 2003 
with Burundi’s transitional government. That disparate accord became part of the Arusha Agreement, hence the CNDD-FDD is 
deemed to be an Arusha Agreement actor. Notwithstanding this, in 2005 when the group assumed power it embarked systematically 
on attempts to undermine the Arusha Agreement resulting in a crisis (Apuuli,2017). Given the discussion by Stedman (1997) above, 
the Nkurunziza led CNDD-FDD is therefore thought to have been a spoiler from the inside. 
Typically, development is a term referring to the strategies and processes through which states and societies seek to attain more 
equitable and prosperous living standards (IPA,2004). Activities directed towards development have often been limited to the 
provision of education and health, infrastructural improvements and socio-economic growth (IPA,2004). Theories of development 
do not always provide explanations that are comprehensive as argued by Abuiyada (2018). For instance, the term does not provide a 
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single perspective on economic, political and social betterment.  Rather, it stands as a hybrid concept for numerous strategies that are 
espoused for transforming the socio-economic environment from the present state to the desired state (Pearson, 2000). Actors for 
international development are organisations whose mandate is to assist in creating conditions that are favourable for development. 
These include agencies and specific UN departments, international financial institutions (IFIs), multilateral and bilateral donors like 
the international NGOs and regional development banks. Development actors have traditionally attempted to reduce risks that are 
related to the conflict in their programmes. They have preferred to circumvent conflict regarding it as an externality which is negative 
to be shunned, or shift developmental aid to humanitarian aid. They have not often worked on the conflict and recognized the 
connection between development and conflict (Apuuli,2017). However, in recent years an increased convergence has been witnessed 
in the activities and strategies of development and security actors operating in countries that are stricken by conflict. The assumption 
being that challenges confronted by countries which are not stable have to be holistically addressed to achieve lasting prosperity and 
peace which is sustainable (IPA,2004).  
Suffice to note that the Arusha accord served Burundi fairly well during the period of transition but the moment the CNDD-FDD and 
Nkurunziza assumed power, it's wearing down started (Apuuli,2017). It appears that when Nkurunziza sought to have the troisième 
mandate (extension of his term of office beyond two terms) was a sign for the absolute act of breaching the Arusha Agreement 
provisions. The guarantors’ silence only encouraged Nkurunziza together with his allies to proceed as spoilers in contempt of the 
Arusha Agreement. To that effect and extent, the win by Nkurunziza of a troisième mandat confirmed what could have been a fait 
accompli, thereby making further allusions to the Arusha institutional framework ring incredibly hollow. (Apuuli,2017). The United 
Nations was set up based on three pillars that are mutually supportive namely: human rights, development, security and peace 
(UNHR, n.d). Yet it is the conflict which has wrecking consequences on fulfilling human rights and development issues (UNHR, 
n.d). The Right to Development of 1986 Article 1(1) adopted by the United UN Declaration provides for an: 
 “Inalienable human right under which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy 
economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized” 
(UNDRD,1986: online). 
It is recognized that international security and peace are important if this objective is to be achieved. Further, the 1966 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR,1966) implores states to marshal available maximum resources for the 
progressive achievement of economic, cultural and social rights 
The pre-colonial era in Burundi 
Before Burundi was colonised it was a kingdom which was well organized and strong. The society was largely made up of four 
groupings namely: The Twa who were entertainers, hunters and potters; the Ganwa who (constituted the ruling class now known as 
the subgroup of the Tutsi) who were largely cow herders; and the group called the Hutu who were cultivators. It was not quite clear 
how the Tutsi and Hutu were related although the actual historical relationship may have been debated (Hatungimana, 2011). A Hutu 
who was rich could have been considered as Tutsi, whereas an underprivileged Tutsi was seen as a Hutu. The Tutsi and Hutu people 
with high social standing and merits had the potential to be raised to the status of the Ganwa. Intermarriages were however tolerated 
among all the groups. Also, all the groups had a common, still speak and spoke the same language, and same religious orientation 
(Ndayizigiye,2005). 
Ndayizigiye classifies the population of Burundi according to the occupational preference per given group. The Hutu are classified 
as farmers, the Twa being potters while the Tutsi are classified as herders, but in general, these three occupations complement each 
other in daily activities. In these circumstances, it is difficult to grasp what could be the real triggers of conflict in the social order 
reflecting a harmonious and interdependent style of life Hatungimana, 2011). It makes this study necessary and relevant because 
even though the three Burundian groups have been able to live together peacefully throughout the pre-colonial era there has been no 
indication whatsoever of ethnic tension between the Tutsis and Hutus. The Arusha Agreement on Burundi is also clear that in the 
pre-colonial era all groups which inhabited the country had their allegiance owed to the same monarchy, the Umwami. Their religious 
belief was based as well on the same god, Imana, sharing the same language (Kirundi) and culture, and living in the same territory. 
Despite the movements due to migration and the subsequent settlement in Burundi by diverse groups of people, every person 
recognises oneself as a Burundian (Hatungimana, 2011). However, Lemarchand (1996) asserts that amid the racist ideological support 
and ethnic chain of command skewed against the group of the Hutus, the colonialists from German in the period between 1889 to 
1918 and from Belgian later in the period between 1918-1962 changed this divide into more pronounced identity rigidities. In this 
case, the coloniser considered the minority Tutsi as being somewhat superior in comparison to the Twa and Hutu. 
Ethnicity in Burundi appears to have been overstated such that a more comprehensive study is required. However, when emphasizing 
the significance of Burundi ethnicity from independence to the present today, it is prudent to observe that the ethnicity definition is 
not quite applicable to Burundi. One definition that is most commonly used to denote ethnicity is found in the Dictionary of 
Anthropology (Barfield 1998:99) stating that:  "it is a grouping of individuals belonging to the same culture, the same religion, the 
same language, same customs and traditions and recognize themselves as such."  An almost similar definition is provided by the New 
Oxford American Dictionary (Stevenson & Lindberg,2015: online):  
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 ” An ethnic group (or ethnicity) is a group of people whose members identify with each other through a common heritage, consisting 
of often a common language, a common culture (often including a shared religion) and ideology that stresses common ancestry or 
endogamy.”  
These two definitions reveal seven essential elements that help to distinguish diverse ethnic groups predicated on their distinctions 
given that ethnic groups should have their own: traditions, culture and language, ideology, religion, territory and special interests. In 
the population of Burundi, these characteristics seem to have never been in existence and do not currently exist (Hatungimana, 2011). 
This is a reality which the Arusha Agreement has confirmed in Article 1:15. Though, Chretien (2000) provides another ethnic group 
definition in agreement with the commonly used definition adding that the Tutsi and Hutu from the Great Lakes of Africa could be 
exceptionally considered as ethnic groupings. For Chretien people residing in the Great Lakes, Tutsis and Hutus included, ethnic 
groups may not have to be differentiated by culture, geographic space, language or history (Chrétien,2000). Accordingly, although 
the issue of ethnicity is of importance to Burundi, it is not necessary the only source of strife. Ethnicity could only be a manifestation 
or used as a pretext whose cause sits elsewhere. 
Burundi under colonisation 
According to Hatungimana (2011), the Tutsi constitute 14 % of the Burundi population while the Twa constitutes 1% and the Hutu 
85 %. As alluded before the Burundi history does not appear to account for any ethnic conflict deemed to be serious, that may have 
occurred prior to the country’s colonisation by the close of the 19th century as argued by Nkurunziza (2018). During the pre-colonial 
era, Burundi was strong, centralised and well-structured, under a monarchy which was secular whose power and authority was not 
contestable.  As a demonstration of Burundi’s strength at that time, in 1884 a group of Arab slave-traders infiltrated the state looking 
for slaves and suffered a shameful defeat from the national army (Gahama, 2001). Subsequently, the slave trade in Burundi was never 
experienced, unlike what happened in other regional kingdoms. The attempts by colonialists from Belgian to overpower the 
Burundian population was faced with related defiance. Many of the missionaries among those Europeans who first got into the state 
of Burundi were exterminated (Bonneau, 1949). For that reason, the modus operandi of colonialists from Belgium on the traditional 
Burundi state was to ensure stamping authority. They had to undermine the established governance system by instituting policies of 
divide and rule violating Burundi’s secular identity (Nkurunziza, 2018). 
Independent Burundi  
Just after the political independence attained in July 1962, there were incessant fighting and splits of political parties due to internal 
conflicts. These two groups that were contesting each other are the Casablanca Group and the Monrovia Group. Casablanca was a 
group which favoured continental integration and pan-Africanism for the good of Burundi, although the Monrovia Group advocated 
for the pan-Africanism it did not do so by sacrificing national sovereignty (Manirakiza,2006). Immediately after independence 
political leaders were heavily seized with political infighting and counter-plotting making successive governments greatly unstable. 
From independence to the period leading to 1966, apparently no meaningful government was ever there. This instability eventually 
gave rise to the 1965 initial major political upheaval. In the course of these hostilities, other governance aspects like democracy and 
economic development had little space on the leadership agenda (Nkurunziza,2018). Despite that the colonial Belgium authority has 
been recognised for creating Burundi’s state of fragility and insecurity, the political leadership of Burundi, mostly those from the 
Tutsis who reigned for the greater part of the post-colonial era, may have prolonged the situation. A couple of months towards the 
independence of Burundi, the decorated liberation hero, Prince Louis Rwagasore, was a victim of political assassination by political 
enemies who tacitly worked in cahoots with authorities from Belgian (Stapleton, 2017). Rwagasore who operated under the party 
known as the Unité pour le Progrès National (UPRONA) ably united the Tutsis and Hutus in his project for independence based on 
his clear vision of development (Nkurunziza,2018). 
Chrétien (2000) argues that historians believe it is the colonialists who divided the Tutsi and Hutu according to race yet they were 
originally regarded as social groupings. This discriminatory policy undermined not just the original structures of the state but created 
also, over the years, the polarity between the Tutsis and Hutus. More expressly, in the period 1928 up until 1934, colonial Belgian 
had to introduce administrative transformations that were far-reaching (Gahama, 2001). These privileged the Tutsis whom they 
considered to be first-class and foreordained for rulership ahead of the perceived backward commoners in the mould of Hutus 
(Sandrart, 1953). For instance, whereas chiefs were traditionally chosen by kings as governors at regional level drawn from the 
groups of the Ganwa, Tutsi and Hutu, reforms imposed by colonialists for administrative purpose replaced all presiding chiefs of the 
Hutu identity with those of either Ganwa or Tutsis. As a result, the percentage of Hutu chieftainship went down to zero in the year 
1945 from 20% back in the year 1929 (Reyntjens, 1994). This meddling into the practices of traditional leadership did not just relegate 
the Hutu leadership, it also created a system of rigid dominion over the Twa and Hutu by the Tutsis and Ganwa. Expectedly, this 
policy generated fierce resentment amongst the Hutus, prompting them to initiate numerous futile attempts to forcibly take over 
power from the Ganwa and Tutsis.  On the contrary, the Tutsi political elite worked to perpetuate and strengthen a system which was 
in their favour. The Tutsis also used the attempts by the Hutus to usurp power as a scapegoat to callously subjugate them. Therefore, 
in independent Burundi, it is not easy to discount or overlook the simmering tension as merely a thing of the past. This schism has 
continued from the post-colonial era to this day.  
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Volatility in politics and state collapse 
 In this political circumstance of instability, a contingent of leaders with the Hutu identity who were perturbed by the perceived or 
real ostracism, made attempts in October 1965 without success to overthrow the government (Nkurunziza, 2016). They believed that 
their majority in terms of population guaranteed them an opportunity to seize power, just like what happened in 1959 in the 
neighbouring Rwanda which stood as their political governance model. On the contrary, the Burundi Tutsi leadership saw the Social 
Revolution of 1959 in Rwanda as an adverse model not to be followed at any rate. Thus, all Hutus’ attempt to wrestle power in the 
country were repressed mercilessly, constantly stoking up hostilities between the political leaders among the two major groups 
(Nkurunziza, 2016). As a consequence, some of the Hutu elites instigated the Hutu countrymen/women in the province of Muramvya 
to kill hundreds of Tutsis. In their response, the army of the Tutsi exploited this opportunity to eliminate the Hutu’s most powerful 
members. About five thousand Hutus were killed by the army in Muramvya as a way of revenging the killings of the Tutsi (Stapleton, 
2017). This became the first massive killings of a political nature in the country.  
 After the Hutu elite were annihilated the previous year, in November 1966 a Tutsi group of officers mainly from the Southern part 
of the Bururi province waged a coup d’état and overthrew a monarchy which had reigned for centuries (Nkurunziza,2018). This 
ended the political system which to some extent had the composition although not in equal proportions of Tutsi and Hutu leaders 
drawn across all the regions in the post-independence era of Burundi. The Tutsi’s small influential group from Bururi put in an 
unlawful system which concentrated military, economic and political powers in their own hands. The side-lining of non-Bururi Tutsis 
and Hutus further even made the country more polarised. The coup d’état of 1966 came to be one of an extended series of them. 
Nkurunziza (2018) notes that the other coups which resulted in power take-over were executed in the year 1976, in 1987, in 1993, 
and then in 1996.  Recently, in May 2015 some officers attempted without success to grab power followed by bloody authoritarianism 
which plunged Burundi into turbulence. 
The political instability with the legacy of most people suffering in Burundi whereby injustices and other crimes were committed by 
agents of the state, ever since the period in the 1960s, was never acknowledged or punished. Also, the rule of law was hamstrung 
permitting political leaders to even be involved in bloody battles in order to be in control of the state, this further deepened the 
insecurity and fragility of the state. Failure by the successive administrations to acknowledge the past crimes perpetrated by the state 
has alienated the population’s sizeable sections, especially the casualties of the crimes (Nkurunziza,2018). The initial attempt made 
to seek a permanent solution to the conflict in Burundi has until now been the negotiations held in Arusha town of Tanzania popularly 
known as the Arusha Agreement for Burundi’s peace and reconciliation.  These negotiations managed to bring together members 
from a wide spectrum including the army, political parties, civil society, international community and the government. The 
negotiations culminated into a peace agreement endorsed in August 2000 then enforced in November in 2001.  This agreement 
successfully brought an end to the protracted episode of civil war in the period 1993-2003. Further, it permitted the Hutu political 
elite who came from those that had experienced protracted persecution by previous regimes to assume power following a bloodbath 
of war. This political agreement was quite radical by ending the Tutsi elite’s domination in the political affairs of Burundi ever since 
the 1930s. Taking into consideration the political discrepancies which the agreement meant to rectify, it appeared tipped towards a 
single group that was traditionally side-lined. 
The latest political leadership did not find it possible to defy the temptations and trials of unlimited power, more so the desire to 
retaliate on previous embarrassments, probably as a result of their less experience in power politics. As envisaged in the Arusha 
Agreement power-sharing collapsed when the new political leaders flunked to uphold the conditions of power-sharing made after 
difficult negotiations. When the Arusha Agreement failed to deliver as was expected it entrenched state insecurity and fragility which 
led to state collapse. From April 2015 the Republic of Burundi experienced a situation of political decadence and violence, resulting 
in deaths of close to 1,200 people while over 400,000 individuals were displaced. The country’s economy contracted by 4%   in 2015 
and 2016 by 1 % only (Nkurunziza,2018). The economic projections that have so far been made for the intermediate-term are quite 
bleak. For instance, according to the International Monetary (IMF,2017), in the period between 2018 to 2022 the GDP’s growth is 
estimated to fluctuate from 0.0% to 0.5% (IMF, 2017).  The country’s failure of political leadership to effectively implement the 
Arusha Agreement as the single available best opportunity for lasting peace and security appears to have taken the country back to 
the previous cyclical trajectory of violence.  
Cyclical violence and the pursuit of peace 
The episode of 1972 deeply affected Burundi such that it had to define when political hostility would occur in the future (ICG,2016). 
Most of the succeeding Hutu elites would either be previous refugees who came back to the country after fleeing in 1972 as adults 
or young ones of those Hutus’ who were slain. Members most well-known in this group included: the former president now late  
Pierre Nkurunziza, whose father died during the 1972 political subjugation and cruelty; the first democratically elected civilian 
president in 1993, Melchior Ndadaye who was formerly a Hutu refugee in 1972; and two of Ndadaye’s successors, Domitien 
Ndayizeye and Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, were also both former refugees in 1972 (Stapleton,2017).  However, in October 1993 after 
being elected and hardly three months in office, Ndadaye was killed by fellows of the Tutsi who were dominant in the army, sparking 
off the most prolonged civil war. The reaction to the assassination of the president whose identity was Hutu by the Hutu group was 
very swift to the extent that others contended that it was a planned assassination by some of the Hutu elite (ICG,2016; Stapleton,2017).  
The army dominated by the Tutsi, just like in the past, continued to repress the Hutus but this never ended the violence. Almost 17% 
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of the country’s population either fled or were killed (Nkurunziza,2018). The elite of the Hutu believed the assassination of Hutu 
president in October was an effort to reclaim power by the Tutsi’s old leadership after a loss during the plebiscite. For the very first 
time, Hutus had to organise a powerful uprising that triggered a war which raged for ten years. Most of its political leaders and the 
military were orphaned children who survived repressions by the government in 1972. 
When the war raged on, warring parties were gotten together by the international community to forge what climaxed into the Arusha 
Agreement. In 2005, the country conducted general elections in which CNDD-FDD became the winner controlled by the insurgent 
Hutu group. The power transfer to the Hutu elite, previous repressions victims orchestrated by the dominated Tutsi administrations, 
was welcomed by several Burundians as bringing in a fresh political dispensation where political aggression will not be tolerated. 
However, experiences revealed that the present-day political leadership just assumed the same strategies and practices which they 
complained about (Nkurunziza,2017). The security role by state institutions in various April 2015 activities of violence has been 
shown when the third term of office was unconstitutionally sought by a sitting president. More than 1,200 people were maimed and 
killed while some were left to languish in detentions by mostly the agents of the state (Nkurunziza,2018). Whereas those non-state 
actors who are engaged in brutality are more often killed in the process of state repressions, not very much may have been put in 
place to isolate and indict those actors of the state illegally involved in violent acts. This has been problematic and hampering a peace 
resolution process in the violence cycle. Whitaker (1985) argues that very life-threatening problems occur if the institution which is 
responsible for causing or threatening death works with or in complicity with the State. Since agents of the state dare to torture and 
kill with impunity implies that the law is applied selectively just to those who are powerless and defenceless. When impunity 
continues, then victims of today will most likely seek to appropriate justice into their hands then perpetuate conflict. 
Peace negotiations led by Africa 
The Burundi conflict involved African prominent leaders who have personally invested their political capital by attempting to look 
for a lasting solution. As earlier stated, the negotiations held in Arusha marked the first thoughtful attempt to look for a permanent 
solution to the political problem in Burundi by Africans. The former Tanzanian President, Julius Mwalimu Nyerere, a highly 
esteemed international politician, expedited the process of negotiations till his demise in 1999. From then on, another highly esteemed 
statesman of Africa, the former South African President, Nelson Madiba Mandela took over the process of negotiations. This calibre 
of main negotiation facilitators drew the international community’s attention to the Burundian crisis. As such the signing ceremony 
of the Arusha Agreement was witnessed and graced by some personalities of international standing such the then Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, Kofi Anan. As noted by Nkurunziza (2016) there were shortcomings identified with the Arusha Agreement. 
Despite this, it provided a footing upon which an inclusive and credible system of politics in Burundi had to be built on. The Arusha 
Agreement recognises in its first paragraph that the signatories to it are conscious that development, justice, peace, the rule of law, 
stability, unity and national reconciliation are the key aspirations for the Burundi people. Also, that the parties are prepared to set 
aside their differences and promote what is common to them and to realise people’s interest (Arusha Agreement,2000). The 
cornerstone of the Arusha Agreement is predicated on national reconciliation to enhance peacebuilding through the National Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission mandated to investigate the past atrocities. The agreement is replete with good provisions if well 
implemented, but Nkurunziza (2016) argues that selective implementation remains a major concern which favours various ruling 
leaders. None of the regimes assigned to implement the Arusha Agreement had some concern to revisit the past for fear that their 
criminalities would resurface (Lemarchand, 2002).  
 In 2015 the Peace and Security Council of the African Union pledged to send into Burundi a strong force of 5 000 officers for 
peacekeeping (Nkurunziza, 2018).  This was resented and opposed by the Burundi government prompting the African Union to do a 
volte-face in January 2016. The United Nations Security Council then pledged in July 2016 to dispatch 288 police officers to Burundi 
and monitor the political situation. The Burundi government repudiated again to oblige, arguing that the country’s police force was 
able to manage the situation (Nkurunziza,2018). For Burundi international diplomacy partly failed owing to contradictions from 
within. For this reason, Toynbee (1969) argues that international intervention should not engage in some treaties involving the same 
despotic holders of political power. One wonders what incentive the Burundi regime had by disallowing the international forces from 
intervention. Perhaps, the distressed Burundi people have had a bad experience of the international criminal law’s ‘principle of the 
‘commission by omission’ and the ‘duty to act’ which in their view can no longer be seen as a dependable foundation of justice. Then 
again, the country’s politicians may have learnt that it is possible to easily defy the will of the international community and forestall 
any external intervention. For Burundi, this does not bode well in the country’s prospect of peacebuilding. 
Conflict causes 
The main implications were guided by the following themes; conflict causes, key assumptions, violence and instability in the past, 
impunity and governance, the approach to political realism, truth and reconciliation constraints. 
Poverty 
The Human Development Report (HDR,2020) reveals that Burundi’s value of the Human Development Index (HDI) for 2019 sits at 
0.433. This places Burundi in the lowest global category of human development-standing at position 185/189 territories and countries, 
sharing this rank with South Sudan. This HDI is lower than 0.513 which is the average for all low human development countries and 
also below 0.547 which is the average for Africa Sub-Saharan countries (HDR,2020). In 2015 the widespread poverty in Burundi 
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was positioned by the UNDP Human Development Index at 184/ 188 with the country’s 81.8% people believed to have 
multidimensional poverty (HRD,2020). 
Demographic burden 
The demographic demands present the country of Burundi as one of Africa’s most densely populated states, being the 11th highest in 
terms of growth rate in the world which was estimated to be 2.85 % in 2020(CIA-Library,n.d). Being one of the African continent's 
most densely peopled nations; its people are largely concentrated in the North and the West along Lake Tanganyika’s Northern shore 
where most of the masses stay in farmlands (CIA-Library,n.d). 
Lack of rule of law 
The UN Commission of Inquiry on Burundi (RCIB,2019) reveals that the former President Pierre Nkurunziza and his cabals have 
been directly responsible for most serious delinquencies and violation of human rights. These include; arbitrary arrests and 
imprisonments, summary executions, torture, forced disappearances and sexual violence. However, the UN Independent 
Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB,2017) has cautioned that it is not exactly possible to quantify most of the abuses that happened and 
even those continuing to happen in a repressive and closed situation in Burundi. 
The persistent insecurity in Burundi which has been pervasive has been a result of the paucity of the rule of law. The country has 
used state institutions as repression instruments coupled with the deliberate absence of checks and balances in the execution of power. 
This led to the alienation of most people in Burundi from political leadership. Some state violence victims resorted also to violence 
as a strategy for survival (kill first before they kill you) or as a means of retaliation against crimes committed in the past. The challenge 
of dispensing justice emanates from a compatibility constraint of incentives, where the current and past political leadership which is 
expected to facilitate justice might be among the chief suspects.  
Violence and instability in the past 
The killing of a freshly elected leader during a coup d’état in 1993, sparked the longest civil war in Burundi. Contrary to this, in the 
period from the 1980s to the 1990s, the presidents Mainassara and Sankara of Niger and Burkina Faso respectively were killed by 
army personnel who later assumed power, yet the two incidents never sparked civil wars This could be suggestive that Burundians 
were unable to absorb the politically motivated assassination shock which Niger and  Burkina Faso managed to do. The recurrent 
political hostility over the past years in Burundi must not be construed as being a result of successive civil wars. Rather, the cyclical 
political hostility has been due to the unwillingness or failure by the political leadership and the state to effectively address the major 
violence causes from the early days when Burundi attained its political independence. One of the major causes of violence remains 
as the effect of disproportionate battles between the political leaders from the two main camps, the Tutsis and Hutus not necessary 
based on ethnicity. Instead, each camp takes a fight for state capture and enjoy the loots.  
Bad governance 
Burundi needs to address this element of bad governance like what Rwanda is doing and poised to do under Kagame’s government, 
if the country has to emerge from the current trap of fragility and insecurity. State fragility in this case is primarily analysed in the 
lens of conflict and insecurity. The failure by Burundi to reconstruct its institutions and economy could be attributed more to the 
choices which the political elites have made in the past and/or which they are still making. Contrasting and comparing the cases of 
Rwanda and Burundi, two nations with initial comparable historical, cultural, institutions, societal mix, and economic conditions for 
development, it shows that Burundi might have long assumed a trajectory completely different from what it is if the right choices 
were made. 
The approach to political realism 
Just like the case of the world’s poorest economies, power in Burundi is the primary source of economic wealth. Abandoning power 
means a return to poverty. Hence anyone who assumes power will do whatever is possible to cling on to it. What matters most for 
many is the satisfaction of their ego, this is the reason why certain individuals in power possess more wealth than the governments 
which they purport to run.  
Truth and reconciliation constraints 
Although Burundi’s peace and security is rooted in the colonial policies of divide and conquer, the recurrence and persistence of 
fights pitting the Tutsis and Hutus is a reflection of the ineptitude by the post-colonial leadership in Burundi to tame and reform these 
discordant policies. The new political leadership had a duty to restore the unity identified with Burundians during the pre-colonial 
era. Yet, since independence, all the various regimes that got into power chose to exploit the real or perceived differences between 
the Tutsi and Hutu as a ploy to tightly cling onto power and continue enjoying the spoils. It is therefore the insensitivity of these 
governments compelling the leadership to be reliant on violence so as to stay in power, further compromising the state peace and 
security needed for development. 
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Critical assumptions and implications 
Land dispute 
This may account for most of the violent activities including beyond the country’s political challenges after decades of displacements 
and civil war. Though several international and national actors may have spent some years dealing with the land issue, it may continue 
affecting relationships countrywide. 
Severe fragmentation among the opposition 
 It may not be easy to mount a significant political challenge by the opposition to the government, especially from exile. Up until 
unity among the opposition, there is not much hope for Burundi to peacefully resolve the latent and overt crisis even after the 2020 
general elections. However, the power-sharing culture in Burundi, the diverse landscape of the media and the strength of civil society 
could salvage the country from collapse. 
The prospects and going forward 
 Burundi’s history of post-colonialism has revealed that there will never be lasting stability and peace in the absence of justice. As 
enshrined in the Arusha Agreement, Burundi does not have a choice apart from revisiting its brutal past and unemotionally redraft 
the history of the country in a more objective manner. Under the present circumstances, it is only the impartial international players 
who seem to be the rightful players who can ably assist to have the country move forward. These neutral players will have to closely 
work with some nearby countries, especially from the regional economic community, in this case, the East African Community, 
which appears to have substantial influence over Burundi’s political leadership. International and regional collaboration could, if 
needed, have the Burundi political leadership persuaded into adopting and implementing an enduring peace and development 
roadmap. That roadmap may have to be based on or developed from the Arusha Agreement or a complete departure from it.  
Conclusion 
The concept of sharing power in an institutionalised manner, based on the quotas of ethnic groups, has been conceived by the peace 
process architects in Burundi as the fundamental guiding principle in the quest for a conflict resolution. The Pretoria and Arusha 
peace processes, the AU and UN, and the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative have equally maintained this understanding. But this 
study concludes that although power-sharing could be a necessary move, presumably as a measure of building confidence, sharing 
power per se is not an adequate condition for sustainable development and peace. The logic behind power-sharing is noble in that it 
protects the minority group. In Burundi, while the Tutsis represent the numerical minority group, for a period conservatively above 
forty years, they have represented a socio-economic and political majority. Despite the Hutus being a numerical majority group, they 
have been subordinated and excluded in the society of Burundi. Therefore, the contention that the Tutsi group who are a numerical 
minority deserving protection is applicable to the Twa and Hutu as well, or even for more protection. Because of the argumentation 
and understanding of peace, security and development discussed in this study, it is suggested that state-building or state reconstruction 
in Burundi be a prelude towards development and peace. To do this, a shift is needed from an exclusionary, predatory state, politics 
of patronage and politics of ethnicity, to a developmental state which ensures law and order, distributive justice, legitimacy, national 
integration, economic opportunity, and provides basic service delivery. Peace, security and development are dependent upon the 
realisation of a system which is democratic, providing genuine political participation and representation, security, equal economic 
opportunity and social mobility transcending boundaries of ethnic groups.  
The prevailing simmering insecurity affecting development in Burundi appears to be merely political, created by a comparatively 
insignificant number of people who are reluctant to comply with the democratic rubrics which brought them into power. As a result, 
they are trying to weaken the political multi-ethnic agenda that has ushered in Burundi into a path tangential to the genocide cycles 
that have been detrimental to peace, security and development. What is required now, apart from a paradigm shift is an active 
engagement by the international community to restore and implement in full, the Arusha Accord. This needs to be done before a new 
wave of violence and disintegration begins post-2020 general elections. This is imperative before it becomes costly to Burundi, the 
international community and the region. 
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